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ABSTRACT
WiFi networks are a popular gateway to connect to the digi-
tal world. It is often required to authenticate before being
allowed to use such networks. Currently most WiFi au-
thentication mechanisms are identifying. This is because
users authenticate using a unique identifier (eg. a user-
name or user-id). This identifier is not always important,
in most cases it is sufficient to show that a user has pos-
session of certain attributes. In this paper we introduce
an anonymous authentication scheme, based on attributes
rather than identities. This results in privacy-friendly au-
thentication for WiFi networks. It can even change the way
how we connect to the digital world.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing deployment of access points for
public wireless networks and the developing momentum of
portable computing devices, people nowadays have increas-
ingly more access to the internet. According to a 2015 indus-
try report published by Wireless Broadband Alliance 90%
of WiFi hotspots will be offered by mobile providers by 2020
[3]. These hotspots are offered as an additional service and
may be used to oﬄoad busy mobile networks.
While wireless hotspots provide convenience for the users,
they may also compromise their privacy. The user’s network
traffic could be collected by other clients on the network or
the access point itself. This can be achieved by investigating
identifying aspects sent over the network (eg. usernames,
MAC addresses) and storing the traffic related to a user.
Later, this data can be used to create a user profile by ag-
gregation.
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Authentication for WiFi is important: without proper
authentication it is possible for everyone to connect to a
network and eavesdrop the ongoing traffic. Public WiFi
hotspots without authentication are usually unencrypted,
therefore everyone can read the content of the messages.
Most of the authentication mechanisms currently used are
identifying. Consider a client that authenticates with Ker-
beros, which is a distributed authentication server. The
client requests a ticket per service (eg. WiFi network) it
wishes to use. Kerberos assigns identifiers (identities) to
the parties participating in the authentication protocol [10].
A user identifier could be ClaireDunphy@ru.nl. With this
identifier it is possible to link all further traffic to a specific
user. Thus, it is possible to know what websites/services a
specific user requested, which forms a privacy threat as was
mentioned earlier.
We propose to authenticate using attribute-based creden-
tials (or just attributes). A commonplace example of using
attributes may be at a liquor store. If you want to buy al-
cohol you need to show that you are over 18 years old. A
customer then presents his/her identity document where the
date of birth is stated. However, you also disclose more in-
formation than is required: your name, place of birth, social
security number (BSN), etcetera. It should actually suffice
to show an attribute stating that you are over 18 years old
and not to disclose any identifying information.
1.1 Related work
Attribute-based credentials are also used for patients and
physicians to authenticate in a medical context [9]. Patients
authenticate in a privacy-friendly fashion to their physicians
prior to starting a treatment. A patient who has an attribute
for a specific illness is allowed to start a certain treatment.
This reduces the number of wrong medical procedures and
is beneficial for patients who do not feel comfortable with
their disease.
Another anonymous WiFi authentication scheme was de-
signed in [14] based on Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).
DAA is an anonymous digital signature scheme, which aims
to provide signer authentication and privacy [8]. Users also
authenticate by means of credentials. However, DAA is com-
putational very expensive and requires a dedicated security
chip. Our implementation does not have such constraints
and could therefore be widely deployed.
Figure 1: Graphical representation of ABC environ-
ment [1].
1.2 Contributions
In this paper we give an analysis of attribute-based creden-
tials and WiFi authentication. We present a protocol which
uses attribute-based authentication in the context of public
WiFi networks. Finally, a proof-of-concept implementation
is presented and some scenarios in which it can be used.
2. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section we discuss the technical background related
to attribute-based credentials and how WiFi authentication
currently works.
2.1 Attribute-based credentials
Authentication using attribute-based credentials consists
of attributes. An attribute is a name-value pair and it of-
ten represents a person’s properties. For example, an adult
male would have the following attributes: gender = male
and age = over 18. Gender and age are the names and
male and over 18 are the corresponding values. A creden-
tial is a cryptographic container storing these attributes. A
credential is issued to a user by a credential issuer. An issuer
can be an authority such as the one that issues passports or
other official legal documents. By issuing a credential an
issuer vouches for the correctness of the attributes with re-
spect to a user. Credentials are cryptographically signed,
therefore it is not possible to change the values in a cre-
dential. For example, modifying the value of the age field
would invalidate the signature and would fail later authen-
tication. It is not possible to share credentials with another
user, since they are united with a private key. This key is
only known to a user (or the user’s device).
With possession of a credential containing some of the
user’s attributes, the user may request access to a service
from a verifier. In the context of WiFi networks, the ser-
vice is WiFi and the verifier is an access point. The verifier
maintains a policy which states what attributes a user must
possess in order to be allowed access to a service. Consider
the liquor store example, the policy of the verifier states that
a user must possess an over 18 attribute. The user dis-
closes, as a response to the policy, only this attribute from
the issued credential. Furthermore, the user must prove that
he/she has possession of the other attributes in the creden-
tial. Therefore the user sends a proof in which he/she shows
that he/she has the undisclosed attributes without disclos-
ing any more information. The attribute-based credentials
environment is graphically shown in figure 1.
There are currently two implementations for attribute-
based credentials: Idemix [6] and U-Prove [5]. In this pa-
per we make use of Idemix. More cryptographic details on
attribute-based credentials can be found in [4, 11].
2.2 WiFi Authentication
WiFi is the wireless transmission of messages and is de-
scribed in the IEEE 802.11 standards. Due to the lack of
a physical connection between a user and the access point,
authentication is an important security requirement. Next
to functional specifications the standards also note some au-
thentication mechanisms. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
was the security algorithm used in the 802.11 standard. It
was responsible for authentication of the users and to pre-
serve confidentiality (ie. to encrypt traffic on the network).
WEP was however proven to be vulnerable [12]. In 2003 the
IEEE came with a temporary substitute called WiFi Pro-
tected Access (WPA) to fix some of the vulnerabilities. One
year later the full replacement was introduced, WPA-2.
With WPA-2 came the introduction of IEEE 802.1X au-
thentication standard. This standard is used for authenti-
cation in both wired as wireless networks. The successor of
WPA came with some security features in addition to WEP:
enhanced authentication mechanisms, key management al-
gorithms, cryptographic key establishment, enhanched data
cryptographic encryption mechanisms [2]. In an 802.1X au-
thentication system there are three parties involved, as is
shown in figure 2:
• Supplicant: which is the user requesting access to the
network.
• Authenticator: which is an access point.
• Authentication server: party that handles authentica-
tion for the access point, this could be integrated in
the access point.
The supplicant and the authenticator have a port access
entity (PAE). The PAE handles the algorithms and pro-
tocols associated with the authentication mechanisms. The
authenticator offers some service, in our context this is WiFi.
This service is protected by the controlled port of the au-
thenticator. Before a user is authenticated the controlled
port is in an unauthorized state, as is shown in figure 2.
This means that all traffic other than 802.1X messages are
dropped. The authentication messages are routed to the un-
controlled port and is used to complete authentication [7].
The extensible authentication protocol (EAP) is used for
the authentication. It describes what messages should be
sent between the PAE of the supplicant and the PAE of the
authenticator. The content of these messages are specific
per authentication method. Some methods available in EAP
are: PAP, MD5 and MSCHAP. When all the messages are
sent and authentication was successful then the controlled
port enters an authorized state. The user is allowed to use
the service of the authenticator.
Figure 2: Graphical representation of 802.1X system
with unauthenticated user [7].
3. ATTRIBUTE-BASEDWIFI
AUTHENTICATION
In this section we combine the privacy-friendly authenti-
cation method provided by attribute-based credentials and
incorporate it in the extensible authentication protocol, so it
can be used to authenticate in the context of WiFi networks.
3.1 Protocol description
EAP describes what messages should be sent and we use
attribute-based credentials to craft the payload of these mes-
sages. Prior to authentication a user must first associate (ie.
connect) with an authenticator. After association, the state
of the controlled port is unauthorized, and the following mes-
sages are being sent between the PAE’s of the supplicant and
the authenticator:
1. The supplicant sends an EAPOL1-Start message to in-
dicate it wishes to start authenticating.
2. The authenticator responds with an EAP-Request Iden-
tity message to request the supplicant’s identity. Tra-
ditionally, this is a username but since we do not have
any usernames this is the set of disclosed attributes.
3. The supplicant sends the set of disclosed attributes.
4. The authenticator checks whether the disclosed at-
tributes are correct (ie. if they are complying with
the policy). If they are then a TLS tunnel is set up
between the supplicant and the authenticator to en-
crypt all further traffic. Otherwise, the authentication
process stops.
5. The authenticator continues by sending an EAP-Request
Challenge message. It is an 256-bit random challenge
to the supplicant. This is to prevent replay attacks (an
attacker that captured a previous message and sends
it again to impersonate a user).
6. Given the random challenge the user generates a fresh
proof where he/she proves knowledge of the undis-
closed attributes, without revealing anything else.
1Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (Local Area
Network). Since the 802.1X standard is also used for wired
networks it states over LAN. In practise the messages are
transmitted wirelessly for WiFi networks.
7. The authenticator verifies whether the proof was cor-
rect. If the proof is correct, an EAP-Access Accept
message is send to the supplicant and the controlled
port is set to authorized. Otherwise an EAP-Access
Reject message is send and the user is denied access.
As we can see the user does not disclose any more in-
formation than is required, which is good from a privacy
perspective.
3.2 Implementation
For the implementation we had to create our own suppli-
cant and authenticator, since existing supplicants and au-
thenticators have no conception of attribute-based creden-
tials. Therefore we used two open-source applications and
one library developed at the Radboud University.
We used WPA Supplicant2 as an application for the sup-
plicant and hostAPD3 for the authenticator. For the im-
plementation of the cryptography we used the credentials
idemix library4. Our goal was to extend EAP with our
attribute-based WiFi authentication protocol. Despite the
name, EAP is not extensible-friendly so instead we modified
an existing EAP authentication method. We modified EAP-
MD5, which is not used anymore for authentication because
of a vulnerability [13] and since it does not generate key-
ing material used to establish a secure connection between
the user and the access point. However, it complies with
the EAP framework requirements. Our adaptation of EAP-
MD5 uses TLS to tunnel the traffic, therefore providing con-
fidentiality for the user. We removed any weak cryptography
related to MD5 and replaced it with our implementation us-
ing the aforementioned library. The implementation is open
source and is available on http://www.aawsome.xyz.
4. SOME REAL-WORLD SCENARIOS
In this section we mention some real-world scenario’s in
which we can authenticate using attribute-based credentials
with respect to WiFi networks.
4.1 KPN Fon
As was mentioned in the introduction, WiFi hotspots will
more often be offered by mobile providers in the future.
At this moment subscribers of KPN are already allowed to
use one of the 20 million hotspots worldwide provided by
Fon. Fon requires users to have an application installed
on their smartphones. Users must register with a user-
name/password combination to prove that they are a KPN
customer. When they authenticate with these hotspots they
send their username and this results in privacy issues for the
user.
A privacy-preserving method would be to let KPN issue
a credential which includes the following attributes:
• I am a customer of KPN
• I pay for plan X
• Expiry date
2More info: https://w1.fi/wpa supplicant/
3More info: https://w1.fi/hostapd/
4Github repository: https://github.com/credentials/
credentials idemix
During authentication the user only sends a subset of these
attributes and a proof where the user shows that he/she pos-
sesses the undisclosed attributes. During authentication no
identifying username is used by the KPN subscriber, which
is better from a privacy perspective.
4.2 WiFi in an airplane
New airplanes have WiFi access points built in and it is
expected that they will be added in current airplanes too. As
was mentioned earlier, it is important to authenticate users
prior to giving them access to the network. Sending a user-
name/password combination for these onboard-networks via
email is suboptimal: users might lose this email, users might
not have internet connection when they have boarded, it is
prone to typing errors and it is not anonymous.
A better solution would be to give passengers a creden-
tial when they are boarding. Passengers would hold their
smartphone against a NFC issuance device which issues a
credential. This credential could for example contain some
of the following attributes:
• Type: passenger or crew. Some websites may be blocked
for crew or passengers.
• Flight number.
• Seat number or class. First class or premium class
passengers might experience a faster connection.
Issuance is fast (approximately 2,5 seconds on smartcards,
but on smartphones this will be faster) and NFC can trigger
the phone to automatically connect to the onboard WiFi
network, which is nice from a usability perspective. Issuance
on laptops might be a little tricky since most laptops do not
have a NFC chip, so they could use Bluetooth or a trusted
USB device. Authentication is privacy-friendly, since a user
only discloses a set of non-identifying attributes (for example
the first and the last), a proof of the undisclosed attributes
and is then allowed to use the network.
There are other scenario’s in which attribute-based WiFi
authentication can be used they are discussed in [11].
5. DISCUSSION
Authentication for public WiFi hotspots is important, oth-
erwise anyone on the network can read the contents of un-
encrypted messages. WiFi hotspots typically use WPA-2
together with a protocol implemented within EAP. Most of
these protocols are however identifying and form a threat
for the user’s privacy. In this paper we presented a more
privacy-friendly method by authenticating using attribute-
based credentials without having any specific hardware re-
quirements for the user. This makes it better widely deploy-
able than DAA. The security of the implemented scheme
relies on the security of the Idemix credential system as is
described in [6] and the credential idemix library.
5.1 Future research
At the moment of writing the current implementation only
works for a single credential. It should however function for
an arbitrary number of credentials.
Authentication should happen on the authentication server
and not on the access point, as is the case with the current
implementation. This releases the access point of perform-
ing large integer arithmetic and would enable support for
mobility. Finally, other ways of issuance should be looked
for. Methods which are optimal for using on laptops and
other non-NFC compatible devices.
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